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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
inheritance taxes, and so forth. But the Marr case may be thought
consistent with all of its predecessors upon the grounds given by
the court: (1) the new preferred securities had different fiscal
qualities from the old ones; and (2) it was likely that the new




ADMISSIBILITY.-[Missouri] A recent case' presents an interesting
question on the practice involved in determining the admissibility of
an alleged spontaneous statement.
Plaintiff sued the receiver of the street railway company,
claiming that while she was a passenger on one of its cars, the
conductor opened the doors on the platform before the car came
to a stop, and that it was stopped with a sudden and unusual jerk,
which caused her to lose her balance and fall from the car to the
street.
Mrs. McGowan, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that she
was sitting in the lobby of a hotel.in front of which the accident
happened, and saw the plaintiff fall, and that she immediately ran
out to the car and reached the plaintiff about the same time that
the conductor got to her, and that the latter then stated that he
opened the door too soon.
The conductor denied making the statement, and he and sev-
eral passengers testified that Mrs. McGowan did not get beyond
the curb until the plaintiff had been picked up and assisted by the
conductor and a young man to the sidewalk.
If the witness' version of the matter should be accepted, the
alleged statement of the conductor was made so soon after the
accident that it might fairly be considered spontaneous and there-
fore admissible under that exception to the hearsay rule.
2
If the conductors' denial should be accepted, there was of
course no statement at all, spontaneous or otherwise.
If the version of the other witnesses, to the effect that Mrs.
McGowan did not reach the scene of the accident until the plain-
tiff had been picked up and assisted to the sidewalk, should be
accepted, then an appreciable amount of time must have elapsed,
and a statement by the conductor could hardly be regarded as
spontaneous.3
1. Rosenzweiq v. Wells (Mo. 1925) 273 S. W. 1071.
2. Prior v. Payne (Mo.) 263 S. W. 982.
3. Luby v. Ry. 17 N. Y. 131; Ry. v. O'Brien 119 U. S. 299; Ruschen-
burgq v. Ry. 161 Mo. 70.
In the opinion, State v. Martin (124 Mo. 514) is cited, where state-
ments of the wounded man were admitted though made after the lapse of
several minutes. The time element is not necessarily fatal to the admission
of a statement as spontaneous where the condition of the declarant is such
as to make it improbable that he could have thought it over: Hill v. Comm.
(Va.) 2 Grat. 594; People v. Del Vermo 192 N. Y. 470. In the principar
case the conductor had not been injured, so that there was nothing to sus-
pend his power of reflection.
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The Supreme Court disposed of the difficulty on the following
basis:
"The admissibility of the declaration must be determined by the
testimony of Mrs. McGowan, and can not be tested by the testimony of
the conductor, who denied making it, or by his testimony and that of
several other persons to the effect that Mrs. McGowan never came near
the car at all, and did not even reach the curb line until the conductor
and the plaintiff's son had assisted plaintiff to that -point. In other
words, whether or not the conductor made the declaration was a ques-
tion for the jury."
If this evidence was admissible, it would, of course, become
a question for the jury to determine for themselves whether they
believed that the conductor made the alleged statement, and if so,
whether it was in fact true.
In that sense there can be no possible doubt of the soundness
of the proposition that whether or not the conductor made the
declaration was a question for the jury. And it may be conceded
that if the other conditions of admissibility were satisfied, the judge
could not reject the evidence in question because he, the judge,
did not believe that the conductor made the declaration, provided
the jury might rationally find that he did.
For example, if it should once be established that an original
document had been destroyed, the judge could not exclude the
testimony of a witness as to its contents because he did not believe
the witness' statement that he had read it, and the result would
not be affected by contradictory evidence making it highly im-
probable that the witness had )ver seen the instrument. This
would be evidence bearing directly on the issue, and its admissibility
would not depend on its truth. The credibility of the witness
on such a question would be exclusively for the jury. So, if it
should be established that no improper influence had been brought
to bear on a defendant in a criminal case, the judge could not
exclude evidence of an alleged confession because he did not be-
lieve that defendant had in fact 4 made any statement on the subject.
Granting then that evidence tending to show that the con-
ductor did not make a declaration on the subject was not relevant
to the question to be decided by the judge, namely the admissibility
of the alleged declaration, it does not follow that the judge could
not consider the testimony tending to show that the witness Mc-
Gowan did not get out of the hotel and on the sidewalk until the
accident was all over and the plaintiff had been picked up and
assisted to the pavement.
4. In the case of Slotofski v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1913) 215 Mass.
318, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts approved the rejection of an
alleged statement by a person since deceased, because the trial judge did not
believe that he made it. But that case seems to turn on a statute making
certain hearsay declarations admissible where the court finds that they were
made in good faith on personal knowledge, etc. It was there held that thejudge could not very well hold that the statement was made in good faith,
etc., if he did not believe that it was made at all.
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The statement in question was hearsay, and that can not be
disguised by calling it a part of the res gestae, or a verbal act.
The speaking of words is always a verbal act, and generally a part
of some larger occurrence with which it has some natural con-
nection.
To illustrate: A trips and falls on a sidewalk and injures
his hand. After he reaches home, he sends for a doctor to dress
his hand, and in the natural course of events declares to the doctor
that the sidewalk at a certain place was obstructed and that he
fell because of it, etc. Here is a naturally connected chain of
events, one of which is A's statement of the cause of the accident.
If it is sought to prove the real cause of the accident by the in-jured man's statement of the cause, it would be the ordinary case
of hearsay, the use of an unsworn, uncross-examined statement,
made outside of the court, to prove the truth of the facts therein
asserted.
The hearsay nature of the statement would be precisely the
same if it had been made a few seconds after the fall to the first
person A met, but in that event the probability of its truth would
be much greater, because, in the language of Lord Holt, it would
be made "before there was time to contrive anything." The great
probability that the statement is true because made before there
was time for deliberation has been thought a sufficient reason for
dispensing with the ordinary safeguards afforded by oath and
cross-examination. And accordingly it would be admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule as a spontaneous statement.5
In other words the admissibility of evidence of such a state-
ment would depend, largely, on the time element, and that would
seem to be a question of fact exclusively for the judge to decide
on all the evidence bearing on that point.
The rule is familiar that the admissibility of secondary evi-
dence of the contents of a written instrument depends on the fact
that the original is unavailable. And in deciding that question
the judge would be bound to consider all the evidence of both
parties on that point. He would not be bound to credit the testi-
mony of one or more witnesses that the document was unavailable,
when opposed by other evidence tending to show that it was avail-
able.
That precise question arose in a leading English case,G and
the rule was thus stated by Baron Parke:
"Now, the rule is, that secondary evidence is not admissible unless
primary evidence can not be procured; and before it can be admitted,
it must be shown, that reasonable efforts have been made, and have
proved unavailing to procure the primary evidence. Such proof was
given in this case, for the plaintiff gave sufficient evidence to let in
parol proof of the contents of the instrument (a letter claimed to
contain certain admissions), if the instrument itself had not been pro-
duced. But the defendant interposed by producing a document which
5. Thompson v. Trevanion Skin. 402. Hill v. Comm. 2 Grat. 594.
6. Boyle v. Wisenan (1855) 11 Exch. 360.
20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
he tendered as the original letter. Whether such was the fact was to be
decided, for the mere statement of the defendant that it was is not
sufficient; neither was the statement of the plaintiff's witnesses, that he
saw the original letter, and that the document produced was not the
original. There being these conflicting statements, the judge was
bound to hear evidence on both sides, and decide whether the document
tendered by the defendant was the original."
A good illustration is furnished by the practice in the case of
confessions.
It would hardly be contended that if a witness for the state
should testify that no promises, threats or compulsion had been
applied, that testimony would bind the judge and force him to
admit the confession regardless of contravailing evidence for the
defense tending to show duress.
In such a case the judge would be bound to hear the evidence
on both sides, and determine from all the evidence whether the
confession was voluntary before admitting it.7
Likewise the admissibility of a dying declaration depends on
the fact that the deceased knew and realized that death was imme-
diately impending, and that he had no hope of recovery, etc., and
accordingly the judge must decide these preliminary questions of
fact on all the evidence, whether conflicting or not.8
The rule that where the admissibility of evidence depends on
the existence of certain facts, the judge must hear the evidence on
both sides, and decide the question on all the evidence, is not con-
fined to confessions and dying declarations in criminal cases, but
is equally applicable to civil cases.
Thus where pedigree or relationship is sought to be proved
by declarations of members of the family, since deceased, the ad-
missibility of the declaration depends on the fact that the declarant
was a member of the family, and that must be determined bjr the
judge from all the evidence bearing on that point.9
7. People v. Nunziato (1922) 233 N. Y. 394; State v. Thomas (1913)
250 Mo. 189. The rule in the confession cases that the judge must deter-
mine the admissibility even on conflicting evidence is the same whether the
court follows the orthodox common law view that admissibility is exclu-
sively for the judge (Burton v. State 107 Ala. 108; State v. Brennan 164
Mo. 487; State v. Monich 74 N. J. L. 522) or whether it follows the
Massachusetts variation that where the confession is admitted, the jury may
be instructed to disregard it if they believe that it was not voluntary, be-
cause, as observed by Justice Holmes, "the whole purpose of the preliminary
action by the judge would be lost if in all cases (of conflicting evidence)
the evidence had to be lad before the jury so as to give them the last
word": Comm. v. Bishop 165 Mass. 148.
The objection to the Massachusetts rule, now apparently followed in
Missouri, is that it may easily result in the practice of admitting the con-
fession in all cases where the evidence on the point is conflicting.
8. State v. Zorn (1906) 202 Mo. 12. State v. Monich (1906) 74 N.
J. L. 522.
9. Doe dem. Jenkins v. Davies 10 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 314.
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Where it is sought to use the statement of an alleged agent
against a party as an admission, the question of agency is one for
the judge.'0
The cases dealing with the function of the judge in deciding
questions of fact involved in the admissibility of evidence are
digested under so many scattered topics that it is impracticable, if
not impossible, to make an exhaustive collection, but a sufficiently
comprehensive grouping was made by Taft, J."
"It is not by any means true that all questions of fact in a jury
trial must be left to the jury. Ntrmerous instances where the court
passes upon such questions can readily be called to mind,,e. g., whether
a witness is an expert; or a dying declarant entertained hopes of recov-
ery; or a writing to be used as a test in comparison of handwriting
is proved; or a witness has sufficient mental capacity to testify, or is the
husband or wife of a party; or declarations are so far a part of the res
gestae as to be admissible; or a confession was induced by threats;
or sufficient search has been made for a lost document to warrant the
introduction of secondary evidence. Many other instances might be
given."
Suppose in the principal case there had been no dispute about
the fact that the conductor made the declaration in question, but
the controversy was limited to whether it was made after such a
lapse of time as to make it a mere narrative and therefore objec-
tionable according to the general hearsay rule.
In that case it seems clear from all the analogies that the judge
would not be bound to admit it on the testimony of one witness
that no more than ten seconds had elapsed, when the other evidence
made it more probable that the lapse of time was nearer ten minutes.
According to the cases, the judge should consider all the evidence
and exclude the statement unless convinced that the time elapsed
between the occurrence and that the statement was very short.
That problem is not affected by the accidental circumstance
that there was also a controversy as to whether any statement at
all was made.
For example, the judge would not be hampered in excluding
an alleged dying declaration, if not satisfied that the deceased
realized that dealth was impending, although there might also be a
dispute as to whether the dying man made any statement at all.
In that event the judge would assume that some statement had
been made and then determine as a fact whether the deceased was
aware of his condition.
So in the principal case, assuming that the conductor made a
statement, the judge could properly take into account the evidence
tending to show that the witness McGowan did not reach the scene
of the accident until an appreciable time after it was all over, for
10. "When agency is relied on as a basis of recovery, the question is
for the jury. But when the declarations of an alleged agent ar2 offered as
evidence upon the main issue, the question whether he was in fact acting as
an agent is for the court": Govw.z v. Hartwell (Vt. 1923) 122 At. 461.
11. Cair s v. Mooney 62 Vt. 172.
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in that case any statement made by the conductor might well be
held a mere narrative. If the court had held that the statement
was admissible though a few minutes must have elapsed, there
would be no particular occasion for comment because there can
be no hard and fixed rule about the time limit.
But the implication that the trial judge had nothing further
to decide if the testimony of a single witness tended to show a
spontaneous statement seems unsound and dangerous.
E. W. HINTON.
PROPERTY - ESTATES - VESTED SUBJECT TO BE DIVESTED-
POWER or APPOINT.MENT-EXERCISE OF POWER-INHERITANCE AND
ESTATE TAxES.-[Rhode Island] In Manning v. Board of Tax
Commissioners' upon the question of inheritance and estate taxes
to be imposed, there was involved a limitation in a will as follows:
"X, testatrix, to A for life then to the child or children of A then
living and if A dies without surviving child or children, then to such
persons as A should by will appoint and in default of child surviving
A or of appointment by A, then to C in fee 'my homestead estate. ...'
In that condition of the will of X, A died without child or
children but leaving a will containing a provision which the court on
a construction of A's entire will, held intended as an exercise of
the power of appointment thus: A, testator, to C in fee, "my
homestead estate. . .
The question to be determined was whether C took the estate
by virtue of the limitation in the will of X, as on default of chil-
dren of and of appointment by A, or took by virtue of the exercise
of the power by A. In deciding in favor of the former alternative,
the court argues that C took a vested estate upon the death of X,
subject only to be divested (1) upon the death of A, leaving a
child surviving, or (2) upon A's exercise of his power of appoint-
ment in favor of someone other than C. The court cites three
Rhode Island cases in support of this position, Moore v. Diamond,2
Grosvenor v. Bower3 and Ken-Von, Petitioner.4
It will be remarked that each of these cases, including the
principal case under comment, is an example of a contingent re-
mainder, the principal case being of the type of a contingent re-
mainder with a double aspect.5 It should be noted also that a con-
tingent remainder is descendible where the contingency is not as
1. (1925) 127 Atl. 865.
2. 5 R. I. 121, where the limitation was X, testatrix to A for life, then
to her children with power to devise at her discretion, but if she die with-
out exercising the power, then to her children.
3. 15 R. I. 549, where the limitation was X, testatrix, to A for life,
then to such persons as A might by will appoint and in default of appoint-
ment, then to X's heirs at law.
4. 17 R. I. 149, where the limitation was X, testator, to trustee in trust
for A for life with power of sale and conveyance in trustee, and after
A's death to X's heirs.
5. Golldday v. Knock 235 Ill. 423; ILL. LAw REv. XIX 457.
